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Towering over the city of Brussels, visible from 
almost anywhere on the ground and seemingly 
oblivious to its surroundings, the Palace of Justice 
is surely one of the most notorious buildings in 
Europe. With a twenty-four thousand ton dome of 
more than a hundred meters high and a built ground 
surface of more than twenty-five thousand square 
meters, it is bigger than St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome 
and was for a long time considered the largest 
building in the world. Its construction took almost 
twenty years, from October 1866 until October 
1883, sparking all kinds of legends about architect 
Joseph Poelaert losing his mind (and the construc-
tion plans along with it). Poelaert, in fact, had died 
in 1879 and thus did not even make it to the day of 
the building’s inauguration.
Its enormous size and eclectic style are detri-
mental to the skyline of Brussels but they have 
spurred the imagination of various artists and 
writers. The Palace of Justice in Brussels, for 
instance, plays an important role in W. G. Sebald’s 
novel Austerlitz (2001) and it is a key element in 
Francois Schuiten and Benoit Peeters’s famous 
historic-futuristic graphic novel Brüsel (1992).1 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, Sebald describes it as ‘a 
singular architectural monstrosity’ and ‘the largest 
accumulation of stone blocks anywhere in Europe’.2
At least one fascinating element in this building 
connects it to something that was hugely impor-
tant to Walter Benjamin’s views on the city and, 
as we will see, illustrates important issues that go 
beyond it: the use of iron and steel in the construc-
tion of large buildings. A mere ten years before the 
construction of the Palace of Justice commenced, 
in 1856, the Bessemer converter was invented, an 
oxygen furnace that converts iron into large and 
commercially interesting quantities of steel and 
thereby drastically revolutionised the architecture of 
big buildings. Ample use of this new technique and 
these new materials was made for the construction 
of the Palace of Justice but, strangely, none of the 
iron and steelwork was kept visible. Huge blocks of 
stone cover up the steel and iron, confining these 
newest of all materials to the darkest of areas within 
the building’s internal structure.
Benjamin’s interpretation of Paris as the so-called 
‘capital of modernity’ helps us to understand what 
was truly going on in such instances. For in his 
essay ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century 
(Exposé of 1935)’, Benjamin states that ‘iron is 
avoided in home construction but used in arcades, 
exhibition halls, train stations – buildings that serve 
transitory purposes’. The invisibility of steel and 
iron in the Palace of Justice, in other words, can be 
read as a disavowal of any semblance of transitori-
ness, specifically because this building needed to 
be presented as a genuine monument to what is 
just and right (it is, after all, a palace of justice).3 The 
visibility of steel and iron, that is, could have been 
regarded as detrimental to the self-presentation of 
the state as an absolute power.
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[rein zeitliche], the relation of what-has-been to the 
now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural 
[bildlicher].4
For Benjamin, the genuine meaning of the past can 
only be understood by turning to what has remained 
behind and to that which has outlived its own 
moment.5 This notion of ‘remains’ can be under-
stood in the double sense of the word. Firstly in the 
sense that the German art historian Aby Warburg 
(1866–1929), who was an important influence on 
Benjamin, makes of it, that is, as a Nachleben or 
‘survival’ of the past within the present and as a force 
that is, against all odds, still at work in and through 
it. ‘Historical “understanding”’, writes Benjamin, ‘is 
to be grasped, in principle, as an afterlife of that 
which is understood’.6
Secondly, one can understand the concept of 
‘remains’ in a more common-sensical manner, 
namely as denoting something that is purely mate-
rial, that is, as a left over or residue. For Benjamin 
true meaning resides not in what is immediately 
understood or experienced as meaningful but in 
those things, remnants, ruins, detritus, that are 
revealed as not being meaningful in themselves 
but as having been made meaningful by way of 
the unsuspected presence of something external. 
In a 1935 letter to Gershom Scholem, for instance, 
Benjamin writes that it is possible to ‘capture an 
image of history’ in ‘the detritus of present exist-
ence’.7 Similarly, in The Arcades Project, he writes 
that ‘the interest which the materialist historian 
takes in the past is always, in part, a vital interest 
in its being past – in its having ceased to exist, its 
being essentially dead’.8
Upon first view, such a connection of time and 
space (time becoming spatial) is reminiscent of 
Benjamin’s famous definition of the aura as ‘a 
strange weave of space and time: the unique 
appearance or semblance of distance, no matter 
how close it may be’.9 It may even evoke the famous 
Picking up on such examples, this review 
article will investigate a conceptual duality central 
to two of Benjamin’s works: the essay on Paris 
mentioned above and his autobiographical text 
Berlin Childhood around 1900 (1932–1938). On 
the one hand, Benjamin renders numerous anal-
yses and descriptions of buildings and experiences 
that present themselves as absolute and internally 
unified, giving the impression of being autono-
mous and immutable. On the other hand, Benjamin 
focuses objects and perceptions that present them-
selves as transient and in flux and are therefore 
experienced as contingent and incomplete. These 
latter objects and perceptions derive their signifi-
cance from something that is inevitably external.
The first striking feature of the essays, Berlin 
Childhood around 1900 and ‘Paris, the Capital of 
the Nineteenth Century’ is that both titles combine 
a spatial reference (in both cases a city) with a 
temporal one. This is not at all a coincidence since it 
reveals something that is dear to Benjamin’s heart, 
namely the idea that the true meaning of a given 
historical period, in this case the nineteenth century, 
can only come to the surface through the careful 
analysis of what was left behind in space, that is, 
buildings and streets. In line with what Benjamin, in 
his unfinished magnum opus The Arcades Project, 
describes as ‘dialectical images’, in both the Berlin 
and the Paris essays it is made clear that, in his 
view, the past only becomes legible through the 
present, that is, through something that it cannot 
in any way have anticipated and that inevitably 
remains alien to it. Benjamin writes:
It is not that what is past [das Vergangene] casts its 
light on what is present [das Gegenwärtige], or what 
is present its light on what is past; rather, image is 
that wherein what has been [das Gewesene] comes 
together in a flash [blitzhaft] with the now to form a 
constellation. In other words: image is dialectics 
at a standstill [Dialektik Im Stillstand]. For while the 
relation of the present to the past is purely temporal 
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that reason, has managed to keep itself intact. In 
other words, the part of information that Benjamin’s 
father left out of the story, the cause of the nephew’s 
death, is not at all absent from Benjamin’s memory 
but, to the contrary, it has become an element of 
‘excess’ in the past or a dimension of ‘too much’ 
within history that has by that token managed to 
survive all the way until the present. To recall his 
memories, therefore, Benjamin has to turn to mate-
rial things that have nothing to do with what is truly 
at stake in the story and somehow retrieves, in and 
from these objects (which are hardly interesting in 
themselves and outlive the visit of the father), that 
which is most essential to this visit.
Two things are important here. Firstly, a Proustian 
element rings throughout Benjamin’s memoirs. 
What is truly meaningful to the Self cannot but 
come as a shock to it. The most significant form 
of memory is considered that type of memory that 
seemingly comes from without, not having been 
appropriated by the narrative individuals tell about 
themselves and build their identities from. What 
genuinely speaks to the self is thus believed to be 
heterogeneous to it: it does not seem to originate 
in the same place as our conscious ego but it has 
seemingly survived of its own accord – alongside 
but not mastered by the faculty of our voluntary 
memories.
Secondly, this past that has preserved itself in, 
as Gilles Deleuze would have it, a ‘pure’ state, has 
managed to do exactly this because it has become 
displaced, that is, because it has lost its most 
proper abode and because it was, instead, kept 
or maintained by a material medium it obviously 
does not have a natural connection with.11 For this 
reason, such moments of the past resonate with a 
sense of dislocation, of incompleteness or a lack 
of fulfillment: they are not autonomous or unified, 
not enclosed in themselves, but they are still, for 
some reason or another, at work or dynamic. Such 
moments of the past have not simply passed: they 
scene in Richard Wagner’s Parsifal (1882) when the 
old knight Gurnemanz leads Parsifal, der Reine Tor 
(the immaculate Fool), to the site of the Holy Grail 
Ritual and the two men cross an enormous distance 
in but a mere number of steps. What is at stake in 
these two examples, however, is the opposite of 
what is at stake in the connection of time and space 
in the Berlin and Paris essays. In the concept of the 
aura, and in Wagner’s opera, the dynamic of a time-
becoming-spatial entails a dynamic of purification. 
In such instances, a given object, however banal 
it may be, resonates with an ambiguity of meaning 
and with a strange distance that renders it untouch-
able and seemingly turns it into an autonomous 
unity. What matters in the Berlin and Paris essays, 
conversely, are experiences (in the first essay indi-
vidual ones, in the second collective ones) that 
are incredibly precise and distinct. These experi-
ences have a presence that is acutely perceived 
by or manifest to the Self and, moreover, they are 
revealed as incomplete and as unfulfilled.
An example drawn from the Berlin text can make 
clear what is at stake here. In a paragraph titled 
‘News of a Death’ Benjamin recalls an experience 
from his youth that can be called ‘an involuntary 
memory in reverse’, that is, an experience that, 
at the moment of its taking place, was already 
perceived to refer forward to a future moment of 
legibility. Benjamin writes:
I may have been five years old at the time. One 
evening […] my father appeared […] [and] gave me 
the news of a cousin’s death. I did not take in every-
thing he said. But I did take special note, that evening, 
of my room, as though I were aware that one day I 
would again be faced with trouble there. I was already 
well into adulthood when I learned that the cause of 
the cousin’s death had been syphilis.10
What is remarkable in this example is that a moment 
in time, in the past, seems to have migrated to 
a place in space, namely a room, and that it, for 
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art’ and uses iron as that element of excess which is 
to be found within the past but is not absorbed by it 
and thus allows it to survive until the present.13 For 
Benjamin, it is important to realise that our under-
standing of the nineteenth century as a historical 
force is tied to an analysis of these things that 
cannot be reduced to the period in which they origi-
nated: what is at stake is to understand the meaning 
of buildings, images, texts and so forth, however old 
they may be, as still unfinished and open to change 
and to grant them a renewed life and significance 
through our interpretations and readings of them. 
This is why he emphasises that steel and iron are 
important because they are ‘transitory’ (they are 
used for tracks and roads, that is, for things that 
serve as a mere gateway for other things), why 
he focuses on the idea that glass is indispensable 
because one cannot leave behind traces on it (glass 
does not have a status of its own: it is a medium, 
both opening up to external reality and shielding 
us from it), why he makes so much of the invention 
of photography (capable of ‘making’ discoveries: a 
photographic image is no mere registration but it 
creates something novel and this something is a part 
of reality) and, most important of all, why he named 
his unfinished magnum opus Passagen-Werk.
 The English translation of this book, The Arcades 
Project, is misleading because it misses both the 
idea of movement and transition (Passage) and the 
idea that such change and flux can be ‘put to work’, 
that is to say, that movement and transition are not 
mere chaos or differentiation but that a specific 
type of significance can be retrieved from within 
it. The Werk in Passagen-Werk denotes that what 
is in movement or transition is not by that token to 
be reduced to mere variation or change. What is 
at stake is the discovery that what is in movement 
can for that reason create a network of relations 
and connections with other things and only in this 
way actualise its meaning. Of central importance 
to The Arcades Project are these phenomena from 
are still in movement and they have the power to 
affect things and moments that they seemingly have 
no affinity with at all.
The same way of thinking underlies the Paris 
essay where the experiences analyzed by Benjamin 
are collective and the past that is commemorated is 
no longer a private or individual one. In the Paris 
text as well, what is at stake is not the past ‘as it 
has been’ but the past to the extent that it still is, 
history to the extent that it is still at work within the 
present. ‘A given state of affairs’, writes Benjamin 
somewhere, ‘becomes historical posthumously, as 
it were through events that may be separated from 
it by thousands of years’.12
 The manner in which the nineteenth century 
becomes historical, in the twentieth century, is 
determined by the material remains that it has left 
behind; not on account of the initial grandeur of its 
buildings and the original splendor of its avenues 
but through the ruins of the former and through the 
over-used and worn-out state of the latter. Thus, on 
a collective level as well, what is truly meaningful 
first comes as a shock to the self-understanding of 
a given state of affairs and, in the public realm as 
well, it is perceived as residual, that is to say, as a 
dimension of ‘excess’ or as a ‘too-much’ of the past. 
It is for this reason that Benjamin introduces, in the 
Paris text as well, the view that certain technical 
inventions create things that are, in origin, artistic 
but subsequently ‘outgrow’ the context of art and 
cannot be fully absorbed by it. In the Paris text we 
see something that is similar to the way in which, 
in the Berlin text, little five-year-old Walter did not 
absorb all of what is father told him but thereby left 
open a dimension of too-much in the past through 
which it became unfulfilled and could therefore 
subsist all the way into the present.
 Benjamin writes that ‘architecture, with the first 
appearance of iron construction begins to outgrow 
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loggias give ‘solace’ but this solace lies precisely in 
‘their uninhabitability’ and it only works for someone 
‘who himself no longer has a proper abode’, that 
is, for someone who has dared to distance himself 
from his normal self-understanding and is open to 
the feeling that something revealing about the ego 
can be found precisely in what lies outside of it.16
 In the Paris text, this same duality underlies, of 
course, Benjamin’s views on the arcades which, 
as covered streets, are a strange combination of 
both the private and the public sphere: as streets, 
they share in the dynamism, anonymity and unan-
ticipated movement that mark the city, but, because 
they are covered, they do not merely signal chaos 
or change but they open up a circus of visibility 
and a festival of gazes in which phenomena and 
processes can be studied and made meaningful. 
The arcades thus constitute a ‘world’ in themselves 
but one that is ‘miniaturised’, that is, one that can be 
made to yield meaning in its very anonymity, contin-
gency and multiplicity.
The most illustrative inhabitants of the arcades 
are, therefore, of course the flâneur and the solitary 
walker. In his review of Franz Hessel’s Spazieren 
in Berlin (1929) Benjamin describes the city as ‘a 
mnemonic for the lonely walker: it conjures up more 
than his childhood and youth [but also] more than 
its [that is, the city’s] own history’.17 The flâneur 
submerges himself in the very randomness, arbi-
trariness and chaos of the city but he nevertheless 
meets it as endowed with a relevance to his own 
particular existence. The meaning encountered by 
the flâneur is therefore neither a quality of the city 
(it does not teach him new facts about the city) nor 
does it allow for a restored possession of the Self: it 
arises in the very movement that relates the city to 
the Self and vice versa and it remains permanently 
dis-lodged between both. The anonymous nature of 
the city is thus a part of the very experience of its 
being meaningful to the Self. Put differently, what 
the nineteenth century that are not reducible to their 
past-ness because they have somehow survived 
into the twentieth century (and continue to survive 
into the twenty-first century). Benjamin is, in other 
words, drawn to phenomena that, through this 
survival and on account of these alterations, make 
legible or understandable what was most essential 
to the nineteenth century and, moreover, what might 
still be of crucial importance to the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. For Benjamin, solely what is 
excessive and residual is still unfulfilled and open to 
change and can therefore render an experience of 
the past that is truly meaningful or significant to the 
present. But this can only happen on the condition 
that we find the means to really grasp such expe-
riences and develop the tools to understand and 
comprehend them for what they are.
Now, the question arises: what spaces, in both 
the Berlin and Paris texts, are most equipped as 
the starting point for this quest to discover meaning 
and significance from within change and move-
ment? In the Berlin text, Benjamin focuses on the 
loggia. The loggia, Benjamin emphasizes, is a type 
of covered balcony that is to be regarded as part of 
both the interior and the exterior of an apartment. As 
Benjamin writes, loggias ‘mark the outer limit of the 
Berliner’s lodging’ and they both grant the lodger a 
view on the hustle and bustle of the outside world, 
while also protecting him from this seeming chaos.14 
It is telling that Benjamin describes the loggia at the 
outset of his biographical essay because it denotes 
a viewpoint from which, indeed, things and experi-
ences that are alive and unfinished, in movement 
and still changeable can nevertheless be studied, 
understood and made meaningful. A loggia ‘allows 
space and time [to] come into their own’ because 
it is sufficiently isolated from outside forces to not 
get fully caught up in them, yet it is also sufficiently 
immanent to them to make a viewpoint possible that 
releases one from all too rigid accounts of the Self 
and identities that are fixed and immobilised.15 The 
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the profanation of the holy day combined with the 
pandering of the street, which here, for the first time, 
gave me an inkling of the services it was prepared 
to render to awakened instincts’.20 This movement, 
therefore, does trigger a feeling of anxiety but 
also, and at the very same moment, a sensation of 
pleasure because it provides proof for the irreduc-
ibility of the chance that the object of one’s desire 
will at some point become available to the self.
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